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Linear Quadratic Mean Field Games – Part I: The Asymptotic
Solvability Problem
Minyi Huang Mengjie Zhou
Abstract—This paper investigates the so-called asymptotic
solvability problem in linear quadratic (LQ) mean field games.
The model has asymptotic solvability if for all sufficiently large
population sizes, the corresponding game has a set of feedback
Nash strategies subject to a mild regularity requirement. We
provide a necessary and sufficient condition and show that in
this case the solution converges to a mean field limit. This is
accomplished by developing a re-scaling method to derive a
low dimensional ordinary differential equation (ODE) system,
where a non-symmetric Riccati ODE has a central role.
Index Terms—Asymptotic solvability, mean field game, re-
scaling, Riccati equation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mean field game theory has undergone a phenomenal
growth. It provides a powerful methodology for handling
complexity in noncooperative mean field decision problems.
The readers are referred to [2], [3] for an overview of the
theory and applications. The analysis in the LQ setting has
attracted substantial interest due to its appealing analytical
structure [8], [14], [16]. Specifically, the strategy of an
individual player can be determined in a feedback form using
its own state.
Two important methodologies called the top-down ap-
proach and bottom-up approaches [3], respectively, have
been widely used in the analysis of mean field games. By
the top-down approach [8], [9], one determines the best
response of a representative agent to a mean field of an
infinite population, and next all the agents’s best responses
should regenerate that mean field. This procedure formalizes
a fixed point problem which can be solved and further used
to design decentralized strategies. The bottom-up approach
(also called the direct approach [11]) starts by formally
solving an N-player game to obtain a large coupled solution
equation system. The next step is to derive a simple liming
equation system by taking N → ∞ [13]; also see [12] for a
probabilistic framework.
This paper considers the LQ mean field game and ad-
dresses the so-called asymptotic solvability. We start with
an entirely conventional solution of the game by dynamic
programming and derive a set of coupled Riccati ODEs.
This method may be viewed as an instance of the bottom-up
approach. Our objective is to find a necessary and sufficient
condition for the sequence of games to be appropriately
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solvable. It turns out that such a condition is completely de-
termined by a single low dimensional non-symmetric Riccati
ODE. The derivation of this condition involves a novel re-
scaling method for large-scale coupled equations with two-
scales of interactions. We further determine the mean field
limit of the individual strategies. Our approach has connec-
tion with an early model of mean field social optimization,
which studies a high dimensional algebraic Riccati equation
and uses symmetry for dimension reduction [6, Sec. 6.3].
The methodology of extracting a low dimensional structure,
here as a non-symmetric Riccati ODE, to capture essential
information of the large scale decision model shares simi-
larity to identifying low dimensional dynamics of coupled
oscillators in the physics literature [15], [17], [19]. Other
related works include [5], [18], [21]. An optimal control
problem for a set of agents with mean field coupling is solved
in [5] by a large-scale Riccati ODE, where a mean field limit
is derived for the Riccati equation using the scalar state and
symmetry. An LQ Nash game of infinite horizon is analyzed
in [18] where the number of players increases to infinity.
The method is to postulate the strategies of all players and
examine the control problem of a fixed player subject to
the mean field dynamics. Then a family of low dimensional
control problems and the parameterized algebraic Riccati
equations can be solved by an implicit function theorem.
Sufficient conditions are obtained for solvability when the
population size is large. The solvability of LQ games with
increasing population sizes in the set-up of [13] is studied
in [21] analyzing 2N-coupled steady-state Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman (HJB) and Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov (FPK) equa-
tions, where each player’s control is restricted to be local
state feedback from the beginning. Some algebraic conditions
are obtained. However, it requires some restrictions on the
model parameters, including symmetric state coefficients in
dynamics.
Note that the top-down approach can also be used to solve
the LQ mean field game [3]. In part II [11] of this paper,
we investigate the relation between the top-down approach
and the bottom-up approach as developed in this paper. A
surprising finding is that they are not always equivalent.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section II
describes the LQ Nash game together with its solution via
dynamic programming and Riccati equations. Section III
presents the necessary and sufficient condition for asymptotic
solvability, for which we give the proof in Section IV.
Section V presents further mean field limits related to the
dynamic programming equation and derives decentralized
strategies. An illustrative example is provided in Section VI.
Section VII concludes the paper.
II. THE LQ NASH GAME
Consider a population of N players (or agents) denoted
by Ai, 1≤ i≤ N. The state process Xi(t) of Ai satisfies the
following stochastic differential equation (SDE)
dXi(t) =
(
AXi(t)+Bui(t)+GX
(N)(t)
)
dt+DdWi(t), (1)
where the state Xi ∈ R
n, control ui ∈ R
n1 , and X (N) =
1
N ∑
N
k=1Xk. The initial states {Xi(0),1≤ i≤ N} are indepen-
dent with EXi(0) = xi(0) and finite second moment. The N
standard n2-dimensional Brownian motions {Wi,1 ≤ i ≤ N}
are independent and also independent of the initial states.
For symmetric matrix S≥ 0, we may write xTSx= |x|2S. The
cost of player Ai is given by
Ji = E
∫ T
0
(
|Xi(t)−ΓX
(N)(t)−η |2Q+ u
T
i (t)Rui(t)
)
dt
+E|Xi(T )−ΓfX
(N)(T )−η f |
2
Q f
. (2)
The constant matrices (or vectors) A, B, G, D, Γ , Q, R,
Γf , Q f , η , η f above have compatible dimensions, and
Q ≥ 0, R > 0, Q f ≥ 0. For notational simplicity, we only
consider constant parameters for the model. Our analysis and
results can be easily extended to the case of time-dependent
parameters.
Define
X(t) =
X1(t)...
XN(t)
 ∈RNn, W (t) =
W1(t)...
WN(t)
 ∈RNn2 ,
Â= diag[A, · · · ,A]+ 1n×n⊗
G
N
∈ RNn×Nn,
D̂ = diag[D, · · · ,D] ∈RNn×Nn2 ,
Bk = e
N
k ⊗B ∈ R
Nn×n1 , 1≤ k ≤ N.
We denote by 1k×l a k× l matrix with all entries equal
to 1, by ⊗ the Kronecker product, and by the column
vectors {ek1, . . . ,e
k
k} the canonical basis of R
k. We may use
a subscript n to indicate the identity matrix In to be n× n.
Now we write (1) in the form
dX(t) =
(
ÂX(t)+
N
∑
k=1
Bkuk(t)
)
dt+ D̂dW (t). (3)
Under closed-loop state information, we denote the value
function of Ai by Vi(t,x), 1 ≤ i ≤ N, which corresponds
to the initial condition X(t) = x= (xT1 , . . . ,x
T
N)
T . The set of
value functions is determined by the system of HJB equations
0=
∂Vi
∂ t
+ min
ui∈R
n1
(
∂TVi
∂x
(
Âx+
N
∑
k=1
Bkuk
)
+ uTi Rui
+ |xi−Γ x
(N)−η |2Q+
1
2
Tr
(
D̂T (Vi)xxD̂
))
, (4)
Vi(T,x) = |xi−Γf x
(N)−η f |
2
Q f
, 1≤ i≤ N,
where x(N) = (1/N)∑Nk=1 xk and the minimizer is
ui =−
1
2
R−1BTi
∂Vi
∂x
.
Next we substitute ui into (4):
0=
∂Vi
∂ t
+
∂TVi
∂x
(
Âx−
N
∑
k=1
1
2
BkR
−1BTk
∂Vk
∂x
)
+ |xi−Γ x
(N)−η |2Q
+
1
4
∂TVi
∂x
BiR
−1BTi
∂Vi
∂x
+
1
2
Tr
(
D̂T (Vi)xxD̂
)
. (5)
Denote
Ki = [0, · · · ,0, In,0, · · · ,0]−
1
N
[Γ ,Γ , · · · ,Γ ],
Ki f = [0, · · · ,0, In,0, · · · ,0]−
1
N
[Γf ,Γf , · · · ,Γf ],
Qi =K
T
i QKi, Qi f =K
T
i fQ fKi f ,
where In is the ith submatrix. We write
|xi−Γ x
(N)−η |2Q =x
TQix− 2x
TKTi Qη +η
TQη ,
and we can write |xi−Γf x
(N)−η |2Q f in a similar form.
Suppose Vi(t,x) has the following form
Vi(t,x) = x
TPi(t)x+ 2S
T
i (t)x+ri(t), (6)
where Pi is symmetric. Then
∂Vi
∂x
= 2Pi(t)x+ 2Si(t),
∂ 2Vi
∂x2
= 2Pi(t). (7)
We substitute (6) and (7) into (5) and derive the equation
systems:
P˙i(t) =−
(
Pi(t)Â+ Â
TPi(t)
)
+(
Pi(t)∑
N
k=1BkR
−1Bk
TPk(t)
+∑Nk=1Pk(t)BkR
−1BTk Pi(t)
)
−Pi(t)BiR
−1BTi Pi(t)−Qi,
Pi(T ) =Qi f ,
(8)

S˙i(t) =−Â
TSi(t)−Pi(t)BiR
−1Bi
TSi(t)
+Pi(t)∑
N
k=1BkR
−1BTk Sk(t)
+∑Nk=1Pk(t)BkR
−1BTk Si(t)
+KTi Qη ,
Si(T ) =−K
T
i fQ fη f ,
(9)

r˙i(t) = 2Si
T (t)∑Nk=1BkR
−1BTk Sk(t)
−STi (t)BiR
−1BTi Si(t)
−ηTQη −Tr
(
D̂TPi(t)D̂
)
,
ri(T ) = η
T
f Q fη f .
(10)
Remark 1: If (8) has a solution (P1, · · · ,PN) on [τ,T ]⊆
[0,T ], such a solution is unique due to the local Lipschitz
continuity of the vector field [4]. Taking transpose on both
sides of (8) gives an ODE system for P Ti , 1≤ i≤ N, which
shows that (P T1 , · · · ,P
T
N ) still satisfies (8). So the ODE
system (8) guarantees each Pi to be symmetric
Remark 2: If (8) has a unique solution (P1, · · · ,PN)
on [0,T ], then we can uniquely solve (S1, · · · ,SN) and
(r1, · · · ,rN) by using linear ODEs.
For the N-player game, we consider closed-loop perfect
state information, so that the state vector X(t) is available to
each player.
Theorem 1: Suppose that (8) has a unique solution
(P1, · · · ,PN) on [0,T ]. Then we can uniquely solve (9),
(10), and the game of N players has a set of feedback Nash
strategies given by
ui =−R
−1BTi (PiX(t)+Si), 1≤ i≤ N.
Proof: This theorem follows the standard results in [1,
Theorem 6.16, Corollary 6.5] .
By Theorem 1, the solution of the feedback Nash strate-
gies with closed-loop perfect state information completely
reduces to the study of (8). For this reason, our subsequent
analysis starts by analyzing (8).
III. ASYMPTOTIC SOLVABILITY
For an l×m real matrix Z = (zi j)i≤l, j≤m, denote the l1-
norm ‖Z‖l1 = ∑i, j |zi j|.
Definition 2: The sequence of Nash games (1)-(2) has
asymptotic solvability if there exists N0 such that for all
N ≥ N0, (P1, · · · ,PN) in (8) has a solution on [0,T ] and
sup
N≥N0
sup
1≤i≤N,0≤t≤T
‖Pi(t)‖l1 < ∞. (11)
Definition 2 only involves the Riccati equations. This is
sufficient due to Remark 2. The boundedness condition (11)
is to impose certain regularity of the solutions, which is
necessary for studying the asymptotic behavior of the system
when N→ ∞.
Let the Nn×Nn identity matrix be partitioned in the form:
INn =

In 0 · · · 0
0 In · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 0 In
 .
For 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ N, exchanging the ith and jth rows of
submatrices in INn, let Ji j denote the resulting matrix. For
instance, we have
J12 =

0 In · · · 0
In 0 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 0 In
 .
It is easy to check that JTi j = J
−1
i j = Ji j.
Theorem 3: We assume that (8) has a solution
(P1(t), · · · ,PN(t)) on [0,T ]. Then the following holds.
i) P1(t) has the representation
P1(t) =

Π1(t) Π2(t) Π2(t) · · · Π2(t)
ΠT2 (t) Π3(t) Π3(t) · · · Π3(t)
ΠT2 (t) Π3(t) Π3(t) · · · Π3(t)
...
...
...
. . .
...
ΠT2 (t) Π3(t) Π3(t) · · · Π3(t)
 , (12)
where Π1 and Π3 are n× n symmetric matrices.
ii) For i> 1, Pi(t) = J
T
1iP1(t)J1i.
Proof: See Appendix A.
By Theorem 3, (11) is equivalent to the following condi-
tion:
sup
N≥N0,0≤t≤T
[
|Π1(t)|+N|Π2(t)|+N
2|Π3(t)|
]
< ∞. (13)
We present some continuous dependence result of param-
eterized ODEs. This will play a key role in establishing
Theorem 5 below. Consider
x˙= f (t,x), x(0) = z ∈ RK , (14)
y˙= f (t,y)+ g(ε, t,y), (15)
where y(0) = zε ∈ R
K , 0< ε ≤ 1.
Let φ(t,x) = f (t,x), or f (t,x)+ g(ε, t,x).
A1) supε,0≤t≤T | f (t,0)|+ |g(ε, t,0)| ≤C1.
A2) φ(·,x) is Lebesgue measurable for each fixed x ∈RK .
A3) For each t ∈ [0,T ], φ(t,x) : RK → RK is locally
Lipschitz continuous in x, uniformly with respect to (t,ε),
i.e., for any fixed r > 0, and x,y ∈ Br(0) which is the open
ball of radius r centering 0,
|φ(t,x)−φ(t,y)| ≤ Lip(r)|x− y|,
where Lip(r) depends only on r, not on ε, t ∈ [0,T ].
A4) For each fixed r > 0,
lim
ε→0
sup
0≤t≤T,y∈Br(0)
|g(ε, t,y)|= 0, lim
ε→0
|zε − z|= 0.
If the solutions to (14) and (15), denoted by xz(t) and yε(t),
exist on [0,T ], they are unique by the local Lipschitz condi-
tion; for (14) in this case denote δε =
∫ T
0 |g(ε,τ,x
z(τ))|dτ ,
which converges to 0 as ε → 0 due to A4).
Theorem 4: i) If (14) has a solution xz(·) on [0,T ], then
there exists 0< ε¯ ≤ 1 such that for all 0< ε ≤ ε¯ , (15) has a
solution yε(·) on [0,T ] and
sup
0≤t≤T
|yε(t)− xz(t)|= O(|zε − z|+ δε). (16)
ii) Suppose there exists a sequence {εi, i≥ 1} where 0<
εi ≤ 1 and limi→∞ εi = 0 such that (15) with ε = εi has a
solution yεi on [0,T ] and supi≥1,0≤t≤T |y
εi(t)| ≤C2 for some
constant C2. Then (14) has a solution on [0,T ].
Proof: See Appendix B.
Remark 3: If (14) and (15) are replaced by matrix ODEs
and (or) a terminal condition at T is used in each equation,
the results in Theorem 4 still hold.
Let
M = BR−1BT .
Before presenting further results, we introduce two Riccati
ODEs: {
Λ˙1 = Λ1MΛ1− (Λ1A+A
TΛ1)−Q,
Λ1(T ) = Q f ,
(17)
and
Λ˙2 =Λ1MΛ2+Λ2MΛ1+Λ2MΛ2
−(Λ1G+Λ2(A+G)+A
TΛ2)+QΓ ,
Λ2(T ) =−Q fΓf .
(18)
Note that (17) is the standard Riccati ODE in LQ optimal
control and has a unique solution Λ1 on [0,T ]. Equation (18)
is a non-symmetric Riccati ODE where Λ1 is now treated as
a known function. We state the main theorem on asymptotic
solvability. The proof is postponed to Section IV.
Theorem 5: The sequence of games in (1)-(2) has asymp-
totic solvability if and only if (18) has a unique solution on
[0,T ].
Our method of proving Theorem 5 is to re-scale by
defining
ΛN1 = Π1(t), Λ
N
2 = NΠ2(t), Λ
N
3 = N
2Π3(t), (19)
and examine their ODE system. We introduce the additional
equation
Λ˙3 = Λ
T
2 MΛ2+Λ3MΛ1+Λ1MΛ3+Λ3MΛ2+Λ
T
2 MΛ3
−
(
ΛT2 G+G
TΛ2+Λ3(A+G)+ (A
T +GT )Λ3
)
−Γ TQΓ ,
Λ3(T ) = Γ
T
f Q fΓf .
(20)
Note that after (17) and (18) are solved on [0,T ] or otherwise
on a maximal existence interval for the latter, (20) becomes
a linear ODE.
Theorem 6: Suppose (18) has a solution on [0,T ]. Then
we have
sup
0≤t≤T
(|Π1−Λ1|+ |NΠ2−Λ2|+ |N
2Π3−Λ3|) = O(1/N).
Proof: The bound follows from Theorem 4 i) by use
of g1,g2,g3 and the initial conditions which appear in the
equations of ΛN1 , Λ
N
2 , Λ
N
3 .
IV. PROOF OF THEOREM 5
Note that Π3 = Π4. We rewrite the system of (A.3), (A.4)
and (A.5) by use of a set of new variables
ΛN1 = Π1(t), Λ
N
2 = NΠ2(t), Λ
N
3 = N
2Π3(t).
Here and hereafter N is used as a superscript in various
places. This should be clear from the context. We can
determine functions gk, 1≤ k ≤ 3, and obtain
Λ˙N1 = Λ
N
1 MΛ
N
1 − (Λ
N
1 A+A
TΛN1 )−Q
+ g1(1/N,Λ
N
1 ,Λ
N
2 ), (21)
ΛN1 (T ) = (I−
Γ Tf
N
)Q f (I−
Γf
N
),
Λ˙N2 = Λ
N
1 MΛ
N
2 +Λ
N
2 MΛ
N
1 +Λ
N
2 MΛ
N
2
− (ΛN1 G+Λ
N
2 (G+A)+A
TΛN2 )+QΓ
+ g2(1/N,Λ
N
2 ,Λ
N
3 ), (22)
ΛN2 (T ) =−(I−
Γ Tf
N
)Q fΓf ,
Λ˙N3 = (Λ
N
2 )
TMΛN2 +Λ
N
3 MΛ
N
1 +Λ
N
1 MΛ
N
3
+ΛN4 MΛ
N
2 +(Λ
N
2 )
TMΛN4
−
(
(ΛN2 )
TG+GTΛN2 +Λ
N
4 G+G
TΛ4+Λ
N
3 A+A
TΛN3
)
−Γ TQΓ
+ g3(1/N,Λ
N
2 ,Λ
N
3 ), (23)
ΛN3 (T ) = Γ
T
f Q fΓf .
In particular, we can determine
g1 =
1
N
(1−
1
N
)(ΛN2 MΛ
N
2 +(Λ
N
2 )
TM(ΛN2 )
T )
−
1
N
(ΛN1 G+G
TΛN1 )
−
1
N
(1−
1
N
)(ΛN2 G+G
T (ΛN2 )
T )
+
1
N
(Γ TQ+QΓ )−
1
N2
Γ TQΓ .
The expressions of g2,g3 can be determined in a similar way
and the detail is omitted here.
Note that if (18) has a unique solution on [0,T ], we can
uniquely solve Λ3. In view of g1,g2,g3 and the terminal
conditions in (21)-(23), by Theorem 4 and Remark 3, we
obtain the desired result.
V. DECENTRALIZED CONTROL
Proposition 7: Suppose that (8) has a solution
(P1, · · · ,PN) on [0,T ]. Then Si(t) in (9) has the form
Si(t) = [θ
T
2 (t), · · · ,θ
T
1 (t), · · · ,θ
T
2 (t)]
T , (24)
in which the ith sub-vector is θ1(t) ∈ R
n and the remaining
sub-vectors are θ2(t) ∈R
n. Moreover, r1 = · · ·= rN .
Proof: We can show that
(JT23S1, J
T
23S3, J
T
23S2, J
T
23S4, · · · ,J
T
23SN)
satisfies (9) as (S1, · · · ,SN) does. Hence S1 = J
T
23S1. We
can further show S1 = J
T
12S2. Following the argument in the
proof of Lemma A.1, we obtain the representation (24).
By (24), we further obtain
r˙i(t) = θ
T
1 Mθ1+ 2(N− 1)θ
T
2 Mθ1−Tr(D
TΠ1D)
− (N− 1)Tr(DTΠ3D)−η
TQη (25)
ri(T ) = η
T
f Q fη f ,
for all i, so that r1 = · · ·= rN ,
Recalling M = BR−1BT , we derive
θ˙1(t) = Π1Mθ1+(N− 1)(Π2Mθ1+Π
T
2 Mθ2)
−
(
AT +
GT
N
)
θ1−
N− 1
N
GTθ2
+
(
I−
Γ T
N
)
Qη , (26)
θ1(T ) =−(I−
Γ Tf
N
)Q f η f ,
θ˙2(t) =
(
ΠT2 +(N− 1)Π3
)
Mθ1
+
(
Π1+(N− 2)Π
T
2
)
Mθ2−
1
N
GTθ1
−
(
AT +
N− 1
N
GT
)
θ2−
1
N
Γ TQη , (27)
θ2(T ) =
1
N
Γ Tf Q f η f .
Let
χN1 (t) = θ1(t), χ
N
2 (t) = Nθ2(t).
We may write the ODEs of χN1 (t) and χ
N
2 (t), which have
the limiting form:
χ˙1(t) = (Λ1M+Λ2M−A
T )χ1+Qη , (28)
χ1(T ) =−Q fη f ,
and
χ˙2(t) = ((Λ2+Λ4)M−G
T )χ1
+((Λ1+Λ2)M− (A
T +GT ))χ2−Γ
TQη , (29)
χ2(T ) = Γ
T
f Q fη f .
For (25), we have the limiting form
r˙(t) = χT1 Mχ1+ 2χ
T
2 Mχ1−Tr(D
TΛ1D)−η
TQη ,
r(T ) = ηTf Q fη f .
Proposition 8: If asymptotic solvability holds,
sup
0≤t≤T
(|θ1(t)− χ1(t)|+ |Nθ2(t)− χ2(t)|) = O(1/N). (30)
Proof: Under asymptotic solvability, we uniquely solve
(Λ1,Λ2,Λ3,χ1,χ2) on [0,T ]. We obtain (30) by writing the
ODE system of (ΛN1 ,Λ
N
2 ,Λ
N
3 ,χ
N
1 ,χ
N
2 ) and next applying
Theorem 4.
A. Decentralized control and mean field dynamics
By Theorem 1, the strategy of player Ai is
ui =−R
−1BT
(
Π1(t)Xi+Π2(t)∑
j 6=i
X j+θ1(t)
)
. (31)
The closed-loop equation of Xi is now given by
dXi(t) =
(
AXi−M
(
Π1(t)Xi+Π2(t)∑
j 6=i
X j
+θ1(t)
)
+GX (N)
)
dt+DdWi. (32)
We introduce
dX¯
dt
= (A−M(Λ1+Λ2)+G) X¯−Mχ1(t),
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Fig. 1. Λ2 has a maximal existence interval small than [0,T ]
where X¯(0) = x0, and further approximate X
(N) by X¯ . When
N→ ∞, we obtain the decentralized control law
udi =−R
−1BT (Λ1(t)Xi+Λ2(t)X¯+ χ1(t)) .
The next lemma provides an error estimate for the mean field
approximation.
Proposition 9: Suppose E supi≥1 |Xi(0)|
2 ≤ C for some
fixed C and limN→∞
1
N ∑
N
i=1EXi(0) = x0. Then
sup
0≤t≤T
E|X (N)(t)− X¯(t)|2 = O(|
1
N
N
∑
i=1
EXi(0)− x0|
2+ 1/N).
Proof: We first write the SDE for X (N) and find the
explicit expression of X (N)(t)− X¯(t). The proposition fol-
lows from elementary estimates by use of Theorem 6 and
Proposition 8.
VI. AN EXAMPLE
Example Take A = 0.2, B = G = Q = R = 1, Γ = 1.2,
Γf = 0, Q f = 0, T = 3. Consider the equation system (17)
and (18):
Λ˙1 = Λ
2
1 − 0.4Λ1− 1, Λ1(T ) = 0,
Λ˙2 = 2Λ1Λ2+Λ
2
2 − (Λ1+ 1.4Λ2)+ 1.2, Λ2(T ) = 0.
Λ1 can be solved explicitly. It is numerically illustrated in
Fig. 1 that Λ2 does not have a solution on the whole interval
[0,T ], implying no asymptotic solvability.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper studies the asymptotic solvability problem for
LQ mean field games and obtains a necessary and sufficient
condition via a non-asymmetric Riccati ODE. The re-scaling
technique used in this paper can be extended to more general
models in terms of dynamics and interaction patterns [7],
[10]. This will be reported in our future work.
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We prove the following lemma first.
Lemma A.1: We assume that (8) has a solution
(P1(t), · · · ,PN(t)) on [0,T ]. Then the following holds.
i) P1(t) has the representation
P1(t) =

Π1(t) Π2(t) Π2(t) · · · Π2(t)
ΠT2 (t) Π3(t) Π4(t) · · · Π4(t)
ΠT2 (t) Π4(t) Π3(t) · · · Π4(t)
...
...
...
. . .
...
ΠT2 (t) Π4(t) Π4(t) · · · Π3(t)
 (A.1)
where Π1, Π3 and Π4 are n× n symmetric matrices.
ii) For i> 1, Pi(t) = J
T
1iP1(t)J1i.
Proof: Step 1. For 1≤ i≤ N, denote
Pi = (P
jk
i )1≤ j,k≤N ,
where each P
jk
i is an n×n matrix. Define the new functions
JT23PiJ23, i = 1, . . . ,N. By elementary calculations, we see
that
(JT23P1J23, J
T
23P3J23, J
T
23P2J23, J
T
23P4J23, · · · ,J
T
23PNJ23)
satisfies (8) together with its terminal condition as
(P1(t), · · · ,PN(t)) does. Hence P1 = J
T
23P1J23, which im-
plies
P 121 = P
13
1 , P
22
1 = P
33
1 , P
23
1 = P
32
1 . (A.2)
Repeating the above by using J2k, k≥ 4, in place of J23, we
obtain
P 121 = P
13
1 = · · ·= P
1N
1 , P
22
1 = P
33
1 = · · ·= P
NN
1 .
We similarly obtain P1 = J
T
24P1J24, and this gives
P 231 = P
24
1 .
Repeating the similar argument, we can check all other
remaining off-diagonal submatrices. Since P1 is symmetric
(also see Remark 1), (P 231 )
T = P 321 , P
23
1 is symmetric by
(A.2). By the above method we can show that all off-
diagonal submatrices on neither the first row nor the first
column are identical and symmetric. Therefore we obtain
the representation of P1.
Step 2. We can verify that both
(JT12P2J12, J
T
12P1J12, J
T
12P3J12, · · · ,J
T
12PNJ12)
and (P1(t), · · · ,PN(t)) satisfy (8). Hence P2 = J
T
12P1J12. All
other cases can be similarly checked.
Proof of Theorem 3: By Lemma A.1, we have
Π˙1(t) = Π1MΠ1+(N− 1)(Π2MΠ2+Π
T
2 MΠ
T
2 )
−
(
Π1(A+
G
N
)+ (AT +
GT
N
)Π1
)
− (1−
1
N
)(Π2G+G
TΠT2 )
− (I−
Γ T
N
)Q(I−
Γ
N
), (A.3)
Π1(T ) = (I−
Γ Tf
N
)Q f (I−
Γf
N
),
and
Π˙2(t) = Π1MΠ2+Π2MΠ1+Π
T
2 MΠ3
+(N− 2)(Π2MΠ2+Π
T
2 MΠ4)
−
(
Π1
G
N
+
GT
N
Π3+
N− 2
N
GTΠ4
+Π2(A+
N− 1
N
G)+ (AT +
GT
N
)Π2
)
+(I−
Γ T
N
)Q
Γ
N
, (A.4)
Π2(T ) =−(I−
Γ Tf
N
)Q f
Γf
N
,
and
Π˙3(t) = Π
T
2 MΠ2+Π3MΠ1+Π1MΠ3
+(N− 2)(Π4MΠ2+Π
T
2 MΠ4)
−
( 1
N
(ΠT2 G+G
TΠ2)
+Π3(A+
G
N
)+ (AT +
GT
N
)Π3
+
N− 2
N
(Π4G+G
TΠ4)
)
−
Γ T
N
Q
Γ
N
, (A.5)
Π3(T ) =
Γ Tf
N
Q f
Γf
N
,
and
Π˙4(t) = Π
T
2 MΠ2+Π4MΠ1+Π1MΠ4
+Π3MΠ2+Π
T
2 MΠ3
+(N− 3)(Π4MΠ2+Π
T
2 MΠ4)
−
( 1
N
(ΠT2 G+G
TΠ2+Π3G+G
TΠ3)
+Π4(A+
N− 2
N
G)+ (AT +
N− 2
N
GT )Π4
)
−
Γ T
N
Q
Γ
N
, (A.6)
Π4(T ) =
Γ Tf
N
Q f
Γf
N
.
Then we can further show that Π3−Π4 satisfies a linear
ODE when Π1 and Π2 are fixed and that Π3(T )−Π4(T ) = 0.
This gives Π3 = Π4 on [0,T ].
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Proof: i) Let xz(t) be the solution of (14) on [0,T ],
and we can find a constant Cz such that sup0≤t≤T |x
z(t)| ≤
Cz, and sup0<ε≤1 |zε | ≤ Cz. Fix the open ball B2Cz(0). For
x,y ∈ B2Cz(0) and t ∈ [0,T ], we have
|φ(t,x)−φ(t,y)| ≤ Lip(2Cz)|x− y|.
For each ε ≤ 1, by A1)-A3), (15) has a solution yε(t)
defined either (a) for all t ∈ [0,T ] or (b) on a maximal interval
[0, tmax) for some 0< tmax < T .
Below we show that for all small ε , (b) does not occur. We
prove by contradiction. Suppose for any small ε0 > 0, there
exists 0< ε < ε0 such that (b) occurs with the corresponding
0< tmax <T . Since [0, tmax) is the maximal existence interval,
we have limt↑tmax |y
ε(t)|=∞ [4]. Therefore for some 0< tm <
tmax,
yε(tm) ∈ ∂B2Cz(0), (B.1)
and
yε(t) ∈ B2Cz(0), ∀0≤ t < tm. (B.2)
For t < tmax, we have
yε(t)− xz(t) = zε − z
+
∫ t
0
[
f (τ,yε (τ))+ g(ε,τ,yε(τ))− f (τ,xz(τ))
]
dτ.
Denote ζ (τ) = f (τ,yε (τ))+ g(ε,τ,yε (τ))− f (τ,xz(τ)) and
it follows that
|ζ (τ)|= |ζ (τ)− g(ε,τ,xz(τ))+ g(ε,τ,xz(τ))|
≤ Lip(2Cz)|y
ε (τ)− xz(τ)|+ |g(ε,τ,xz(τ))|.
Now for 0≤ t < tm,
|yε(t)− xz(t)| ≤ |zε − z|+ δε
+
∫ t
0
Lip(2Cz)|y
ε (τ)− xz(τ)|dτ.
Note that δε =
∫ T
0 |g
(
ε,τ,xz(τ)
)
|dτ → 0 as ε → 0. By
Gronwall’s lemma,
|yε(t)− xz(t)| ≤ (δε + |zε − z|)e
Lip(2Cz)t
for all t ≤ tm. We can find ε¯ > 0 such that for all ε ≤ ε¯ ,
(δε + |zε − z|)e
Lip(2Cz)T <
Cz
3
.
Then for all 0 ≤ t ≤ tm, y
ε(t) ∈ B3Cz/2(0), which is a
contradiction to (B.1). We conclude for all 0 < ε ≤ ε¯ , yε
is defined on [0,T ]. Next, (16) follows readily.
ii) We have
yεi(t) = zεi +
∫ t
0
[
f
(
τ,yεi(τ)
)
+ g
(
ε,τ,yεi(τ)
)]
dτ, (B.3)
and
| f
(
τ,yεi(τ)
)
+ g
(
ε,τ,yεi(τ)
)
|
≤ Lip(C2)|y
εi(τ)|+ | f (τ,0)+ g(ε,τ,0)|
≤ Lip(C2)|y
εi(τ)|+C1
≤ Lip(C2)C2+C1, (B.4)
where C1 is given in A1).
By (B.3)-(B.4), the functions {yεi(·), i≥ 1} are uniformly
bounded and equicontinuous. By Ascoli’s lemma, there exists
a subsequence {y
εi j (·), j = 1,2,3, · · ·} such that y
εi j con-
verges to y∗ ∈C
(
[0,T ],RK
)
uniformly on [0,T ]. Hence,
y∗(t) = z+
∫ t
0
f
(
τ,y∗(τ)
)
+ g
(
ε,τ,y∗(τ)
)
dτ
for all t ∈ [0,T ]. So (14) has a solution.
The proof in part i) follows the method in [20, sec. 2.4]
and [22, pp. 486].
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